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Abstract:  The United States spends $20 billion each year on farm subsidies. Farmers face 
increased risk and income variation when their crop portfolio is less diversified. It’s possible for 
farm subsidies to decrease diversification if they are focused on specific crops. Utilizing state level 
subsidy and agricultural data from the Environmental Working Group, I estimate the effect of 
farm subsidies on crop diversification. I expect to find that crop specific subsidies decrease crop 
diversification, which prior research suggests may have negative consequences for farmers and 













Do Farm Subsidies Affect Crop Diversification? 
I. Introduction 
The United States spends $20 billion each year on farm subsidies (Top Crops in the States We 
Serve). Farmers face increased risk and income variation when their crop portfolio is less 
diversified. Utilizing state level subsidy and agricultural data from the Environmental Working 
Group, I estimated the effect of farm subsidies on crop diversification. I found that crop specific 
subsidies have an impact on diversification. Some crop subsidies increase overall crop 
diversification while others lead to less diversification. Research suggests that decreases in crop 
diversification has negative consequences for farmers and society in general.  
Crop diversification in this paper is defined as a variety of crops grown in one region or on one 
farm. I look at diversity across species not within. This rarely discussed topic has a sizeable impact 
on both farmers and agriculture policy makers. This paper contributes to literature attempting to 
understand the effects of government subsidies on long-term agricultural outcomes. There is little 
research done on this topic within the field of agriculture, and considering its substantial effects, it 
is it is important to explore the relationship between subsidies and crop diversification.  
In 1845, Ireland faced a widespread hardship known as the Irish Potato Famine. The 
country had a large monocultural potato crop (Monoculture and the Irish Potato Famine: Cases of 
Missing Genetic Variation). Within one year, a simple blight wiped out 40% of the potato crop 
across the nation, leaving the citizens with few agricultural alternatives leading to cases of 
starvation and financial ruin (Irish Potato).  
This paper begins with a literature review examining past crop diversity research, and the 
consequences of having less crop diversity. Section III looks at the economics theory behind the 
question. Section IV explains the sources of the data, the basic model, and an explanation of each 
variable. Section V details the results and the interpretation of the significant variables. Section VI  
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describes limitations with my model and the various techniques used to address each issue. 
Finally, Section VII reviews the findings and application of this study. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 There are many studies that examine the impact of subsidies on crop output, acreage, and 
price changes. Wu and Adams found that insurance premiums affect the acreage planted and alter 
cropping patterns ( 2001). Ye, Yokomatsu, and Okada found that farm output changes in response 
to subsidized insurance premiums (2012). Babcock, Fabiosa, and Jacinto explore the impact of 
ethanol subsides on corn prices (2011). However, none of these studies consider subsidies’ impact 
on crop diversity. 
Crop diversity in agriculture is essential, as D. M. Spratt emphasizes in his esteemed 
research on biodiversity. Specifically he states, “Some undetermined level of biological diversity 
is necessary to maintain ecological function and resilience” (1997). Crop diversification is a buffer 
against blights, pest outbreaks, and natural events such as drought, oversaturation, and frost (Lin 
2011). A decrease in crop diversity means an increase in the likelihood that crops will suffer from 
blights similar to the one in Ireland. The difference between 1845 and today is that we have 
modern insecticides to help overcome this weakness. Meehan and Gratton find a statistically 
significant relationship between landscape simplification and the use of insecticide (2015). As 
crop diversity decreases, the farmers increase their use of insecticides or vise versa. Without the 
buffer of crop diversity, farmers are forced to use the controversial method of insecticides to 
protect their crops. 
Aguilar et al say, “Diverse cropping systems tend to increase farmers’ chances of 
encountering favorable conditions while decreasing the probability of widespread crop failures” 
(2015). He means that the risk is spread out across several different crops, which is beneficial 
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because each crop has its own unique tolerance level for inclement weather (2015). Aguilar et al 
found in their recent research based on long-term data collected in Ontario, Canada, that 
“compared to simple corn/corn and corn/soybean cropping systems, more diverse systems that 
included a small grain such as wheat, or under-seeding with a cover crop such as red clover, 
produced more stable yields over a 31 year period” (2015). This research exemplifies the pattern 
that crop diversity leads to a more consistent harvest. Despite the benefits of more diverse 
cropping systems there is still a decline in crop species diversity (Gaudin 2015). More strikingly, 
Aguilar et al found that crop species diversity in the United States was lower in 2012 than in 1978 
(2015).  
Bianchi, Booij, and Scharntke find that a decrease in crop biodiversity is from agricultural 
intensification, which is the act of trying to produce more units per acres of land (2006). In 
addition to agricultural intensification I found that federal crop subsidies also contribute to 
decreases in diversification. Crop specific subsidies lower the growing cost of that crop, create 
attractive profits, and incentivize farmers to convert more acreage into the production of that crop. 
Price support subsidies guarantee farmer’s revenue allowing them to keep their prices high 
regardless of market conditions, creating even better profit margins (Spratt 1997). Therefore, it 
follows that crops with higher expected profit yields are planted more abundantly. In a market 
with no price controls, the market would adjust to the equilibrium price and quantity. The quantity 
demanded would be supplied at an equilibrium price. Instead, in the agricultural market price 
support subsidies act as price controls, preventing the price from changing. This creates a price 
floor and means quantity will rise until the USDA lowers the price level by reducing subsidies 
(Thompson 1993).  
Crops that receive subsidies are grown more abundantly than those that do not (USDA). 
Crops with higher profit margins will replace those with lower profit yields. Wright and 
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Wimberley (2013) found that the steep price of corn caused by ethanol subsidies led to more 
grassland being converted into corn (Alan, Doraiswamy, and Hunt 2013).  “The area planted in 
corn increased from 4.7 million hectares in 2001 to 5.7 million hectares in 2007, which was 
correlated with the market price for corn” (Alan, Doraiswamy, and Hunt 2013).  
Stern, Doraiswamy, and Hunt find that crop prices are correlated with acres planted (2013). 
It is not directly the price that causes corn be more widely planted but rather larger profit margins 
created by subsidizing the crop.  
 
III. Economic Theory  
Crop insurance subsidies create unintended consequences. They create a moral hazard 
because taxpayers pay about 60% of the premium, meaning, “Over time most farmers can expect 
to collect far more in payouts than they pay in premiums” (EWG). Farmers respond to these 
incentives by behaving rationally in “planting crops on poor-quality land, cutting back on things 
like pesticides and fertilizer that reduce the risk of crop losses and reducing the extent to which 
they diversify their enterprises” (Smith, 2015). Smith points out that subsidies cause farmers to 
practice riskier behavior by not diversifying their crops and not using as many protective measures 
such as insecticides (2015).  
The Peltzman effect is a behavioral economic theory that states, as safety measures 
increase people tend to take more risks. This can be seen with the subsidized insurance premiums. 
As the insurance safety net is increased, farmers react with riskier behavior by not diversifying 
their crops since they know they will be covered and not suffer a large loss if a blight or other 
event wipes out their entire crop.  
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
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The data used for this research was collected from a State level panel of four primary sources. 
The first source is the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service. The data set provides 
detailed agriculture statistics from the county to the national level. Specifically from this data, I 
used statewide panel data of individual crop prices and acres planted per year. My second source 
was the Environmental Working Group’s (EWG) Farm Subsidy Database. This source provided 
me with statewide panel data of the dollar value for subsidies paid toward the production of 16 
different crops from 1995 to 2014. The data is organized by crop per year. I used the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) database for the climate variables in my 
model. These variables,  𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸_𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸 and 𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑈𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑆𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌, vary across 
states and over time. My last primary data source was the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Producer 
Price Index (PPI). I used the PPI data to adjust crop prices for inflation over time. 
My data spans 20 years, 1995 to 2014. It includes 49 states (Hawaii was dropped because 
it did not grow any of the 16 crops chosen for this paper). The 16 crops were chosen based on the 
top subsidized and top produced field crops grown in the United States (Farm Bureau Financial). 
Tobacco was dropped because no data was available for acres planted. Dropping tobacco reduced 
the number of crops to 15. Following these drops, the number of observations in my sample fell 
from 1,000 to 980. Instead of using the statewide crop price, I used average national price to 
prevent problems occurring with states that did not grown any of that crop. The states that did not 
grow the specific crop would have a price of zero which would cause an error in the relationship 
between crop price and subsidies. 
Using number of acres planted, I derived my dependent variable, Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1      Where n = number of crops grown in yeart and Si = crop’s market share         (1) 
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The Herfindahl- Hirschman is a measurement used by the Department of Justice, Federal 
Trade Commission, and state attorneys general to measure market concentration when evaluating 
company mergers. HHI is not about the number of crops grown in the state but rather the 
distribution of market share or in this case crop concentration. 10,000 is the maximum value. This 
would mean that a state is monoculture and grows only one crop in that one state. The minimum 
value is zero. This would mean that a state grows a little of almost every type of crop in the state. 
“A merger potentially raises ‘significant competitive concerns’ if it produces an increase in the 
HHI of more than 100 points in a moderately concentrated market.” An HHI of less than 1,500 is 
considered unconcentrated (Chin 2016). 
I choose to use acres planted instead of acres harvested to capture the true intention of the 
farmer’s planting decision. This helps to control for variation from external factors that might 
cause a difference between acres planted and acres harvested. The variation would most likely 
cause a downward bias on the true effect of subsidies on amount of crops grown. 
To estimate the effect of crop specific subsidies on crop portfolio diversity, I use the 
following empirical model that contains state fixed effects to control for invariant characteristics 
between states and across time. 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0+β1𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡+β2𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑃_𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡+β3 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸_𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡+β4 𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑈𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑆𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡
+ β5𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐹𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
HHI is the measure of crop market concentration, which comes from equation (1). 
SUBSIDY is the dollar value of a subsidy paid toward a specific crop in year t. CROP_PRICE is 
the real price received for a crop measured in dollars per lb., bushel, or cwt. 
AVERAGE_TEMPERATURE is the absolute value of the temperature’s deviation from the mean. 
This measurement is important because it measures the difference between the expected and actual 
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temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. The absolute value equally weights the deviation since 
temperatures colder or warmer than expected both have an impact on crop growth. 
DROUGHT_SEVERITY is the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) value. This index reports 
moisture level of the earth’s soil where zero is normal and -4 is extreme drought. Positive values 
mean higher than normal levels of moisture in the soil. Too much moisture in the soil can have 
equally adverse consequences on crop growth as drought does (Kanwar, Baker, Mukhtar 1998). 
Therefore, I use the absolute value of the PDSI value to give equal weight to both drought and 
over-saturation. STATE_FE are state fixed effects, and εit is the normally distributed error term.  
Looking at the summary statistics, the largest crop subsidy was corn, with a mean of $107 
million. Wheat, cotton, soybean, and rice were also very large with average subsidies of $40, $ 36, 
$32, and $14 million. The smallest subsidies were Dry Peas, Oats, and Canola with averages of 
$34, $50, and $494 thousand. Two negative subsidies are found in the summary statistics. These 
two negative subsidy values come from 2003 South Dakota barley subsidies, and 2003 Delaware 
sorghum subsidies. The subsidies are negative because premiums paid by the farmers to the 
USDA risk management department were greater than the payout by the USDA for those specific 
crops, in SD. and DE. in that year. Potatoes and Hay did not receive any subsidies. The mean HHI, 
market share concentration measure, was 4,058.  
Summary Statistics 
  Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      State 0 0 0 0 
      Year 2004.5 5.769226 1995 2014 
      PDSI. Index 1.6556 1.3724 0 7.38 
      Temp Dev from mean°F 0.9833 0.7614 0 4.4 
      HHI 4058.837 1812.524 1276.81 10000 
      Barley_subsidy 2,865,035 8,965,507 -1,560,047 89,700,000 
      Canola_subsidy 494,105 4,099,084 0 64,000,000 
      Corn_subsidy 107,000,000 213,000,000 0 1,940,000,000 
      Cotton_subsidy 36,500,000 109,000,000 0 1,190,000,000 
      Hay_subsidy 0 0 0 0 
9 
 
      Dry Peas_subsidy 34,401 378,665 0 6,249,410 
      Oats_subsidy 50,370 3,59,565 0 6,666,593 
      Peanut_subsidy 3,971,452 21,700,000 0 491,000,000 
      Potato_subsidy 0 0 0 0 
      Rice_subsidy 14,600,000 58,700,000 0 677,000,000 
      Sorghum_subsidy 7,323,856 26,300,000 -6,928 252,000,000 
      Soybean_subsidy 32,300,000 73,000,000 0 756,000,000 
      Sugar beet_Subsidy 143,574 1,725,581 0 34,400,000 
      Sunflower_ Subsidy 1,055,431 5,778,095  79,600,000 
      Wheat_subsidy 40,800,000 77,100,000 0 683,000,000 
      Barley_price 3.50 1.52 1.95 6.69 
      Canola_price 15.96 7.24 0.00 30.87 
      Corn_price 4.07 1.91 2.13 8.74 
      Cotton_price 67.60 19.35 33.82 107.82 
      Hay_price 134.48 13.58 81.51 143.34 
      Dry peas_price 11.56 5.10 0.00 20.26 
      Oats_price 2.72 1.03 1.42 4.66 
      Peanut_price 0.28 0.06 0.20 0.43 
      Potato_price 8.45 2.70 5.07 13.24 
      Rice_price 12.00 5.14 4.78 20.82 
      Sorghum_price 6.61 3.27 3.14 14.80 
      Soybean_price 9.19 4.01 4.75 17.61 
      Sugar beet_price 50.80 14.69 33.67 85.44 
      Sunflower-price 18.78 8.61 7.99 36.03 
      Wheat-price 5.09 2.17 2.46 9.32 
 
V. Results 
In this section, I report two sets of OLS crop diversification results: one with state level 
fixed effects and one without. To address concerns of heteroscedasticity, I use robust standard 
errors in both variations. The two results both have significant coefficients at the .05 type I error 
level for subsidy and price variables. The largest difference is in the adjusted R-squared. OLS with 
state level fixed effects has an adjusted R-squared of .965. Running the same model without state 
fixed effects returns an R-squared value of .167. This shows that state level fixed effects explains a 
large amount of variation in the model.  
Linear regression with state fixed effects 
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Number of obs   =        980 
F(  30,    901) =       4.27 
Prob > F        =     0.0000 
Adj R-squared   =     0.9653 
Root MSE        =   337.4000 
  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 95% Confident intervals 
Year   -2.007714 17.29983 -0.12 0.908    -35.96036       31.94493 
PDS Index     7.263384 9.333012 0.78 0.437    -11.05359       25.58036 
°F dev. From mean      -3.39993 20.82481 -0.16 0.870    -44.27071       37.47085 
Barley_subsidy 0.00000145 3.60E-06 0.4 0.687     -5.61e-06       8.51e-06 
Canola_subsidy         -0.0000223** 0.0000109 -2.05 0.040    -.0000436      -9.85e-07 
Corn_subsidy         0.000000102 9.07E-08 -1.13 0.261     -2.80e-07       7.59e-08 
Cotton_subsidy 0.000000289 1.80E-07 1.61 0.107     -6.29e-08       6.42e-07 
Hay_subsidy -             -                -       -                                    -                   - 
Dry Peas_subsidy       0.0000354* 0.0000191 1.86 0.064     -2.00e-06       .0000728 
Oats_subsidy        -0.0000748** 0.0000239 -3.13 0.002    -.0001217      -.0000279 
Peanut_subsidy       0.00000146** 5.08E-07 2.88 0.004       4.66e-07        2.46e-06 
Potato_subsidy -             -                -       -                                    -                   - 
Rice_subsidy          -.000000919*** 2.38E-07 -3.87 0.000   -1.38e-06           -4.53e-07 
Sorghum_subsidy   0.00000105 8.80E-07 -0.23 0.822    -1.93e-06       1.53e-06 
Soybean_subsidy         0.00000105*** 2.68E-07 3.92 0.000      5.26e-07       1.58e-06 
Sugar beet_Subsidy -0.00000373 3.27E-06 -1.14 0.255    -.0000102       2.69e-06 
Sunflower_ Subsidy         0.0000134** 6.26E-06 2.13 0.033      1.07e-06       .0000256 
Wheat_subsidy      -0.00000125** 5.17E-07 -2.41 0.016     -2.26e-06      -2.33e-07 
Barley_price      -34.95109 81.0801 -0.43 0.667    -194.0789       124.1767 
Canola_price            -16.9263** 6.254845 -2.71 0.007    -29.20206      -4.650538 
Corn_price       83.28706 200.8556 0.41 0.678    -310.9122        477.4864 
Cotton_price       3.506568 2.811706 1.25 0.213    -2.011688        9.024824 
Hay_price      -2.892213 2.543935 -1.14 0.256    -7.884941        2.100514 
Dry peas_price       8.099798 14.67588 0.55 0.581       -20.7031       36.9027 
Oats_price           -58.91206** 20.95636 -2.81 0.005        100.041      -17.78309 
Peanut_price      -793.4014 751.9775 -1.06 0.292     -2269.233       682.43 
Potato_price         -36.22911* 20.12677 -1.8 0.072     -75.72992       3.271696 
Rice_price            22.88003** 9.53074 2.4 0.017      4.174996       41.58507 
Sorghum_price      -19.44942 67.7826 -0.29 0.774     -152.4796       113.5807 
Soybean_price      -24.61833 6.160654 0.47 0.639     -96.00346       46.7668 
Sugar beet_price       2.887553 6.160654 0.47 0.639        -9.20335       14.97846 
Sunflower_price      -33.20325 20.64353 -1.61 0.108      -73.71831       7.311821 
Wheat_price       40.10713 88.00783 0.46 0.649      -132.6171       212.8313 
*** significant at .01  
 
 
Linear regression without State Fixed Effects       
Number of obs =     980 
F( 31,   948) =   10.21 
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Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.1669 
Root MSE      =  1681.2 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P value 95% Confidence interval 
Year         32.1611    90.74127 0.35 0.723  -145.9159      210.2381 
PDS Index 180.0447*** 28.89858 6.23 0.000  123.3321      236.7573 
°F Dev. from mean     96.12742** 56.63974 1.7 0.005 -15.02634      207.2812 
Barley_subsidy    -0.0000101 8.87E-06 -1.14 0.256  -.0000275      7.33e-06 
Canola_subsidy  0.0000272* 0.0000162 1.68 0.094 -4.59e-06      .0000589 
Corn_subsidy        2.69E-07 2.48E-07 1.08 0.279  -2.19e-07      7.57e-07 
Cotton_subsidy      -2.31E-06*** 5.70E-07 -4.04 0.000 0.00000342   -0.00000119 
Hay_subsidy -             -                -       -                                -                    - 
Dry Peas_subsidy    0.0004676* 0.0000773 6.05 0.000 .0003159      .0006194 
Oats_subsidy    -8.72E-06** 0.0000799 -0.11 0.913  -.0001655      .0001481 
Peanut_subsidy    -5.66E-06** 2.41E-06 -2.35 0.019  -.0000104     -9.35e-07 
Potato_subsidy -             -                -       -                                -                    - 
Rice_subsidy -5.29E-06*** 9.13E-07 -5.79 0.000  -7.08e-06     -3.50e-06 
Sorghum_subsidy -9.81E-06*** 2.70E-06 -3.64 0.000  -.0000151     -4.51e-06 
Soybean_subsidy    -2.36E-06** 8.24E-07 -2.87 0.004  -3.98e-06     -7.45e-07 
Sugar beet_Subsidy -0.0000688*** 0.0000156 -4.41 0.000  -.0000995     -.0000382 
Sunflower_ Subsidy -0.000083*** 0.0000156 -7.25 0.000  -.0001055     -.0000605 
Wheat_subsidy    4.44E-06** 1.41E-06 3.16 0.002 1.68e-06      7.20e-06 
Barley_price    -206.7345 439.9257 -0.47 0.639 -1070.075      656.6061 
Canola_price    -72.50976*** 20.10843 -3.61 0.000  -2813.377      2301.908 
Corn_price    -255.7346 1303.278 -0.2 0.844  -2813.377      2301.908 
Cotton_price      -3.04271 14.84754 -0.2 0.838  -32.18055      26.09513 
Hay_price 4.48319 16.25074 0.28 0.783 -27.40839      36.37477 
Dry peas_price      97.69435 80.74782 1.21 0.227 -60.77079      256.1595 
Oats_price      32.66686 118.3994 0.28 0.783  -199.6884      265.0221 
Peanut_price      3237.101 4013.233 0.81 0.42   -4638.747      11112.95 
Potato_price  9.871267* 167.8436 0.06 0.953  -319.5167      339.2593 
Rice_price -90.47202* 49.31765 -1.83 0.067  -187.2564      6.312364 
Sorghum_price      58.84689 396.5533 0.15 0.882  -719.3769      837.0706 
Soybean_price      25.40146 198.7345 0.13 0.898 -364.6089      415.4118 
Sugar beet_price      18.96123 51.03113 0.37 0.71  -81.18581      119.1083 
Sunflower_price      -83.07931 88.97438 -0.93 0.351  -257.6888       91.5302 
Wheat_price       506.5073 765.2419 6.23 0.508 -995.2566      2008.271 
_cons     -61420.62 179086 -0.34 0.732  -412871.4      290030.2 





The rice and soybean subsidies were the most significant of my key variables. They are 
both significant at the .01 type I error level. The coefficient for rice is -9.19e-07. This means that 
for every dollar spent on rice specific subsidies HHI will decrease by –9.19e-07 which is an 
increase in the diversification of crops. The magnitude of this decrease is seen by multiplying the 
coefficient by the average rice subsidy. The average rice subsidy is $14.6 million. Therefore rice 
subsidies increases diversification by 13.4 HHI. This is a .3 percentage point increase in crop 
diversification. Canola, oats, and wheat subsidies also have negative coefficients and are all 
significant at the .o5 level. 
Soybeans, peanuts and, sunflowers are significant at the .o5 level and have positive 
coefficients meaning, that an increase in those subsidies decrease crop diversification. Soybean 
was the most significant and had the largest magnitude with a coefficient of 1.05e-6, and a mean 
subsidy of $32 million. The impact of soybean subsidies is an increase of 33.9 HHI which is a .84 
percentage point increase in crop diversification. 
 The real price variables for canola, oats, potatoes, and rice are statistically significant. 
These first three have negative coefficients, meaning that a $1 increase in the price of these crops 
decreases HHI. The decrease in HHI means an increase in crop diversification. For example, a $1 
increase in canola per cwt. will decrease HHI by 16.9points. In contrast to the first three crops the 
coefficient of rice is positive; therefore, an increase in price of rice leads to an increase in HHI, 
decreasing the diversification of crops planted. 
Not all crop subsidies have the same result. An increase in a subsidy for one crop may increase 
variety while an increase in another will reduce variety. In order to understand why subsidies 
either increase or decrease crop diversification, consider the impact soybeans, wheat, and corn 
have on crop diversification in the Corn Belt. Because these three crops are grown in the same 




As one of the top two abundant crops, soybean subsidies will decrease diversification.  
Increasing soybean subsidies means less wheat and more soybean acres planted. Soybean_subsidy 
has a positive coefficient signaling a decrease in crop diversification. Although wheat is the third 
most grown crop in the United States, increasing wheat subsidies actually increases diversification 
because farmers replace the most abundantly grown crops, corn and soybean, with wheat (USDA 
2016). The decrease is shown in the negative coefficient of wheat_subsidy. While both soybean 
and wheat are widely grown in the Corn Belt, when subsidized, the two crops have opposite 
effects on diversification.  
 
VI. Limitations 
Corn was not significant in this model, most likely due to other forms of subsidies 
indirectly paid to farmers through energy mandates and tax breaks. These imitation subsidies are 
not captured in my model. The Renewable Fuel Standard mandate is a government-funded 
program that incentivizes the production of corn by providing tax credits to petroleum companies 
that blend ethanol with their fuel (Renewable Fuels Association 2016). These tax incentives, 
adopted in 2007, provide farmers approximately $10 million per year (Bryce 2016). Lark, 
Salamon, and Gibbs (2015) found that The Renewable Fuel Standard has a significant impact on 
the displacement of existing crop for corn production. In a later draft of this paper, I will include 
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the annual $10 million in my model, which I believe will strengthen the correlation between corn 
subsidy and HHI, causing the coefficient of corn-subsidy to be significant. 
I was unable to find data on farm productivity. One concern is that the omission of 
productivity as a variable in my model causes bias. In an effort to minimize this possible bias 
along with the bias caused by other immeasurable and invariable characteristics between states, I 
included state fixed effects in my model. This inclusion pushed the climate variable coefficients 
down. Drought severity index, which is not statistically significant with state fixed effects, is 
significant at the .01 type I error level in the model without state level fixed effects.  
Measurement error of subsidies is another concern. My measure of crop subsidies includes 
both specific (direct) and non-specific (indirect) subsidies. A specific subsidy is a payment to a 
farmer to grow a certain crop. A non-specific subsidy is a payment to farmers regardless of what 
type of crop they plant. The problem is that while the inclusion of non-specific subsidies causes 
measurement error, the data I used made it is impossible to separate them from specific subsidies. 
For example, subsidized insurance premiums are non-specific and, therefore, do not depend on the 
type of crop planted. The independent relationship between the type of crop planted and the 
subsidized insurance premiums causes a noisy measurement and a downward bias on the 
coefficient for subsidies. Available aggregate data shows that subsidized insurance premiums can 
range from 3.5% (sorghum) to 73% (soybean) of subsidy payments depending on the crop. 
Knowing that this measurement error exists, subsidy effects found to be significant are likely more 
significant than they actually appear to be. 
My model does not include a variable for the distribution of subsidies. Approximately 10-
15% of farmers receive 85% of all farm subsidies (Smith and Goodman 2015). With this 
information comes the concern that the impact of subsidies on crop diversification would be 
immeasurably small. However, large farms account for 66% of output, due mostly to economies of 
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scale. Using this knowledge and the knowledge that large farms receive 74% of all subsidies, it is 
safe to assume that the effect of subsidies on crop diversification will be measurable (Koba 2014).  
 Having an independent price variable and a quantity measure as a dependent variable 
causes simultaneity. To address this issue, I used a market concentration measure for my 
dependent variable instead of a direct measure of quantity. Some simultaneity still exists, but it is 
not as significant as if I used a direct quantity measure.  
One final concern is the existence of negative multicollinearity between subsidy and crop 
price. An increase in subsidies for a particular crop will decrease the price of that crop and vise- 
versa. Many subsidies are triggered when a crop price falls below a certain threshold (Edwards 
2016). I compared the correlation between the two variables for each crop. I found only slight 
correlation between each pair with the highest being .0992 between cotton subsidy and cotton 
price. Subsidy is my key variable, so I am unable drop it. If the correlation was strong enough, I 
would drop the price variable. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Crop specific subsidies significantly affect crop diversification. Farmers respond to the 
incentive of lower growing costs by replacing existing crops with the subsidized crops. Less 
diverse cropping systems and farm portfolios increase the probability of suffering from adverse 
consequences such as crop failure, blights, pests, frost, drought, and oversaturation. 
An increase in the HHI of more than 100 points in a moderately concentrated market raises 
significant concerns about market concentration (Chin 2016). Over the 20 year span of my data, 
crop specific subsidies have increased HHI an average of 16.79 points. Wheat had the largest 
impact, decreasing HHI by 51points. Even with the limitations of noisy measurement error and the 
distribution of subsidies, the results are large in magnitude. With the ability to tease out this bias, 
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the results recorded would carry even greater significance. When considering introducing, 
increasing, or decreasing subsidies, agriculture policy makers need to first consider the impact on 
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